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Abstract
By means of a macroeconomic model with an agent-based house-
hold sector and a stock-flow consistent structure, we analyse the im-
pact of rising income inequality on the likelihood of a crisis for differ-
ent institutional settings. In particular, we study how economic crises
emerge in the presence of different credit conditions and policy reac-
tions to rising income disparities. Our simulations show the relevance
of the degree of financialisation of an economy. In fact, when inequal-
ity grows, a Scylla and Charybdis kind of dilemma seems to arise: on
the one hand, low credit availability implies a drop in aggregate de-
mand and output; on the other hand, relaxed credit constraints and a
higher willingness to lend result in greater financial instability and a
debt-driven boom and bust cycle. We also point out that policy reac-
tions play a key role: a real structural reform that tackles inequality,
by means of a more progressive tax system, actually compensates for
the rise in income disparities thereby stabilising the economy. Results
also show that this is a better solution compared to a stronger fiscal
policy reaction, which, instead, only leads to a larger duration of the
boom and bust cycle.
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1 Introduction: Inequality, Institutions and Fi-
nancialisation
It is widely established that inequality increased substantially, both in de-
veloped and in emerging economies, starting from the late 1970s (Atkinson
et al., 2011; IMF, 2007; Milanovic, 2010; OECD, 2008; Piketty and Saez,
2013). In particular, in Europe and in the United States those who have
lost ground belong to the middle class, while in other areas of the world,
such as China, the rise of inequality has hit the very poor. Nonetheless, in
all cases the redistribution has benefited mainly the rich and the very rich
(the top one percent of the population, see Figure 1), giving birth to what
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) define as the “Superstar Economy”.
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Figure 1: Average Change in Income Shares for Different Percentiles - 1980-
2007.
Even though widening income inequality seems to be a widespread phe-
nomenon in the recent years (Table 1), cross-country differences have emerged
in terms of economic performance1.
The American economy, for example, performed reasonably well with an
average annual growth rate of 3.16% between 1981 and 2007. In particu-
lar, the United States have experienced an excess of demand over domestic
production that resulted in an increasingly important trade deficit, which in
2006 peaked at almost 6% of GDP. This deficit was financed by the excess
savings that, with different causes, characterised other regions of the world
1Among the selected countries, France is the only one where the Gini index has de-
creased in the selected time-span.
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Country oldest latest
Canada 32.59 (1991) 33.68 (2010)
China 27.69 (1984) 42.06 (2010)
France 33.00 (1989) 31.69 (2005)
Germany 28.61 (1984) 31.83 (2007)
Italy 32.52 (1986) 35.52 (2010)
India 31.11 (1983) 33.91 (2009)
Russia 23.81 (1988) 40.94 (2010)
Spain 32.33 (1990) 35.75 (2010)
United Kingdom 36.21 (1991) 38.04 (2010)
United States 36.96 (1986) 41.12 (2010)
Table 1: Gini index for selected countries (years in parentheses). Source:
FRED
for more than a decade.
In China and in other East Asian countries, due to the lack of a proper
welfare state and of a reliable financial system, higher inequality yielded an
excess of precautionary savings for businesses and households.2
Following growing income disparities, continental Europe (Germany in
particular) experienced excess savings as well, even though, in our view,
they were caused by the inertia of economic policy and by low investment
rates, which depressed demand and income. As such, this part of the region
relied on export-led growth alone.
These opposite imbalances compensated each other for almost two decades,
resulting in an overall balance that the recent crisis proved to be fragile. The
reason why increased inequality has led to excess savings in some areas, while
resulting in excesses demand in others, lies in the interaction of the trend in
income distribution, common to all countries, with institutional differences
- most notably, the degree of financialisation - and the policy responses that
have taken very different forms.
As a matter of fact, the development of financial markets seems to be a
key factor that explains such differences among countries. As pointed out by
Kumhof et al. (2012), the increase in income inequality in the United States
and, in general, in more advanced economies, has not been tackled by means
of political interventions to support the living standards of those who suffer
from stagnating incomes. Rather, policy authorities have temporarily alle-
viated its consequences “through access to cheap borrowing, in other words
through financial liberalization” (Kumhof et al., 2012). Krueger and Perri
(2006) argue that the rise in inequality in the United States led to a change
2In addition, after the 1997 crisis, authorities in these countries started a policy of
reserve accumulation to deal with possible sudden stops.
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in the development of financial markets, which have allowed households to
better insure against fluctuations of income. Therefore, in the United States,
the reduction in income has been offset by private borrowing, made easier
by a less regulated financial system, but also by a widespread perception
of “end of history” which led to believe that all constraints to the unlim-
ited growth of some sectors (financial, real estate) had been permanently
removed. Consequently, aggregate demand has remained high, even if it has
been debt-driven rather than income-driven.
Hence, as claimed by Van Treeck (2013), “in advanced economies with
highly developed financial markets, including most notably the United States
and the United Kingdom, rising inequality has led to a deterioration of na-
tional saving-investment balances, as the poor and middle classes borrowed
from the rich and from foreign lenders to finance consumption”.
However growing inequality in other regions of the world, such as China,
led to a different outcome because “financial markets are less developed and
hence do not allow the lower and middle classes to respond to lower incomes
by borrowing” (Van Treeck, 2013). The implication is a weaker domestic de-
mand and the emergence of an export-oriented growth model, where richer
creditors lend to foreign rather than domestic borrowers. Also continental
Europe has developed an export-oriented growth model, as stricter regula-
tion of financial markets and less accommodating monetary policies have
made borrowing for households and firms more difficult and expensive. Pe-
ripheral Europe also experienced a rise in top income shares in the recent
decades (Atkinson et al., 2011). However, in contrast with the rest of the
continent, these countries recorded growing level of household indebtedness
as well as current account deficits (Kumhof et al., 2012).
Some authors point out that also policies have played a role in amplify-
ing the imbalances among countries. For example, Rajan (2010) argues that
monetary authorities in the United States fostered the speculative boom by
implementing an expansionary policy in order to stimulate the economy, thus
facilitating household access to credit markets and sustaining consumption
for a while, albeit at the price of booming household debt. Rajan empha-
sises in particular the role of government failures: “the political response to
rising inequality whether carefully planned or an unpremeditated reaction
to constituent demands was to expand lending to households, especially
low-income ones”, so as to end up with rising household debt. While Rajan
may be right in pointing at excessively lax monetary policy, the role of the
central bank has only led to the amplification of a structural phenomenon,
namely widening income disparities (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011).
One might also wonder why monetary policy has been the main policy
instrument. Stiglitz (2012) suggests that political reasons matter in this
case:
High inequality is often accompanied by a demand for a smaller
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government and more fiscal restraint. (...) Policies are often af-
fected by lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving doors,
so that the wealthy have disproportionate influence. Thus, as in-
equality grows, at least in many countries, so too do constraints
on the government’s fiscal space (Stiglitz, 2012, p.33).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces our macroeco-
nomic model; Section 3 provides an analysis of model results obtained by
means of Monte Carlo ripetitions; we also check for the robustness of our
results through sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In the light of the considerations above, we build a macroeconomic model
with an agent-based household sector. Our goal is to show how the institu-
tional setting and credit conditions interact with the impact of rising inequal-
ity on the performance of the economy and the accumulation of household
debt. Our work follows part of the literature on macro agent-based models.
In particular, Cardaci (2014) analyses the consequence of rising inequality
in a context of peer effects in consumption and equity extraction processes.
The paper shows that widening income disparities result in a debt-financed
consumption boom that jeopardises the stability of the economic system (a
similar result is found in Russo et al., 2015). Our paper represents a step
forward. In fact, not only we include an analysis of the impact of inequality
for different degrees of financialisation, but we also assess the effectiveness
of different fiscal policy reactions. This is in line with the contribution by
Dosi et al. (2013) that focuses on the effect of inequality under different
monetary and fiscal policies. They show that more unequal societies suffer
from more severe business cycles oscillations and higher unemployment rates
thus increasing the likelihood of economic crises. Yet, their model allows for
the accumulation of private debt by firms only. On the contrary, we apply
our analysis on household loans since, in our opinion, the link between in-
equality and financial instability in the recent years ran precisely through
household debt (Cardaci, 2014; Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013). On the other
hand, this might allow for a generalisation of the policy implications of our
findings.
Our model is also stock-flow consistent (SFC). The SFC approach is
commonly used in the Post-Keynesian literature and dates back to the con-
tributions by Tobin (1969, 1982) and, more recently, Godley and Lavoie
(2007). The idea behind this methodology is that transactions in asset
stocks imply the existence of an interlocked system of balance sheets, as
Godley and Lavoie (2007) point out. As such, SFC models are built upon
an accounting framework whose goal is to coherently integrate all stocks and
flows of an economy, so that “every monetary flow, in accordance with the
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double-entry book keeping logic, is recorded as a payment for one sector and
a receipt for another sector, and every financial stock is recorded as an asset
for a sector and a liability for another sector” (Caiani et al., 2014).
Let us now go through the details of the modelling structure.
Our model follows the “KISS” (keep it simple, stupid!) principle. As
such, we devote our effort to the development of the household sector, while
simplifying all the others as much as possible. Hence, the distinctive features
of our economy are as follows:
• There is only one representative firm which is owned by all households
and distributes all its earnings thus retaining zero profits.
• There is no investment in capital goods.
• Households’ desired consumption is based on imitative behaviour and,
more precisely, on the Expenditure Cascades hypothesis (Frank et al.,
2014)
• There is a credit market for non-collateralised loans to households.
• There is a public sector with a government that can issue bonds to
finance its deficit (if any).
The model has a sequential structure regarding decisions about flows
and actual balance-sheet transactions. The entire sequence of events in each
period t can be summarised as follows:
1. Production takes place. The firm produces homogenous perishable
goods using labour as the only input.
2. The firm distributes wages to all households. This process is based on
individual income shares drawn from a Pareto distribution.
3. If the commercial bank has a positive net worth, it distributes the
entire amount of profits to households based on the same income shares
as in the previous point. However, in case of a negative net worth, the
commercial bank is bailed out by the central bank via a transfer of
assets (i.e. reserves). Note that, in any case, the commercial bank has
zero net worth at the end of this phase.
4. Households pay taxes. Tax payment is based on a progressive system
of taxation on income. Tax rates are computed endogenously in period
t and they remain constant for all the remaining periods. Collected
taxes add up to the government deposit account held by the central
bank.
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5. The government then pays back its principal and interest on bonds to
each household, based on the repayment schedule set in the previous
period.
6. Households compute their desired consumption based on imitative be-
haviour and assess their own financial position. This latter may be
positive, if their internal resources are higher than their desired con-
sumption and due debt, or negative, otherwise. Households with a pos-
itive financial position use the exceeding amount of internal resources
to demand government bonds, whereas households with a negative fi-
nancial position ask for a loan. Note that, as such, households can
demand loans in order to finance desired consumption as well as to
perform debt rollover, that is, to pay back the debt from the previous
period.
7. Policy institutions decide their targets: the central bank sets the policy
interest rate while the government sets its desired public expenditure.
Both decisions are based on the value of the “demand gap” in the
previous period and follow an anti-cyclical rule.
8. The bond market opens: if desired public expenditure exceeds col-
lected taxes and past deposits, the government needs to borrow from
households, thereby computing its supply of bonds. Total bond de-
mand simply equals the sum of individual bond demand by each house-
hold, as mentioned in point 6. Note that the bond market may be in
disequilibrium since total supply and demand are the result of inde-
pendent decisions.3
9. The pay-back phase (PBP) begins: households pay back the loan (prin-
cipal plus interest) from the previous period. This does not include
borrowers who need to perform debt rollover, as they do not have the
internal resources to meet their debt obligations entirely. Hence, they
will enter the credit market trying to get a new loan and, afterwards,
they will go through a second PBP in order to repay the old one.
10. The credit market opens: the bank sets its total available credit supply
as a fraction of total credit demand and ranks households in ascending
order based on their financial soundness. Loan applications, computed
by households at step 6, are satisfied until the bank runs out of total
credit supply. This implies that credit-rationing may occur in the mar-
ket: more financially fragile households may not get any loan from the
commercial bank. Credit-rationed households will not be able to fi-
nance their desired consumption entirely and to perform debt rollover.
3Note also that we don’t allow for government debt monetisation, so that the amount
of deficit is constrained by savings. This simplifying assumption plays little role, as in the
simulations below government bond supply is always the short side of the market.
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Hence they go bankrupt and as such they are not allowed to apply for
a new loan for a number of periods.
11. A second PBP opens: households who needed debt rollover and suc-
cessfully got a new loan in the credit market, can now pay back the
loan from the previous period.
12. The goods market opens: government and households buy goods based
on their desired level of consumption. If the output produced by the
firm at step 1 is lower than overall desired consumption, rationing
takes place. On the contrary, in case of excess supply, we assume the
firm gets rid of the unsold amount of its perishable goods at no cost.
13. Finally, all macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP, Public Debt, Private
Debt) are updated.
Figure 2: Transaction flows in our economy.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of all the transactions taking
place in our artificial economy, based on the sequence reported above. These
are represented as flows from a typology of agents to the others. In order
to make sure that our model is stock-flow consistent so that no flow “leaks
out” of the system, each agent is provided with a balance sheet that allows
us to track and measure the levels of all stock variables at any point in time.
Table 2 shows the balance sheets of all the agents in the economy at the end
8
of each period, with the household sector represented in aggregate terms for
simplicity.4
Household
Assets Liabilities
Deposits (Dt,H) Loans (Lt,H)
Bonds (Bt)
Bank
Assets Liabilities
Loans (Lt,H) Households deposits (Dt,H)
Reserves (Rt) Firm deposits (Dt,F )
Firm
Assets Liabilities
Deposits (Dt,F )
Government
Assets Liabilities
Deposits (Dt,G) Bonds (Bt)
Central Bank
Assets Liabilities
Reserves (Rt)
Government deposits (Dt,g)
Table 2: Agents’ balance sheets in our economy.
Stock-flow consistency implies that any transaction that takes place in
the economy is matched by an identical change in the stocks held in the
balance sheets of the agents involved. For example, when the firm pays
the wage bill, it transfers all of its deposits to the household sector through
the commercial bank. Table 3 provides a numerical example: firm deposits
lower by their entire amount, whereas household deposits increase accord-
ingly. This transaction is reported also on the liability side of the balance
sheet of the bank. Yet, the net worth of the bank does not change since
4Note that central banks do not lend unsecured to commercial banks, as they usually
take collateral to protect against the possibility of loss due to credit and market risk (Rule,
2015). Yet in our framework, when the commercial bank is bailed out by the central bank,
it receives liquidity (i.e. new assets called reserves) without transferring any assets to the
central bank. In other words, our simplifying assumption is that the bailout does not
require any collateral or reimbursement and, as such, the central bank does not hold any
asset.
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a transfer of deposits does not modify the overall amount of liabilities it
holds.5 In general, at the end of each period, agents may have positive or
negative individual net worth, depending on the difference between assets
and liabilities. However, stock-flow consistency in our model implies that
the overall value of the net worth in the economy must always be zero, not
only at the end of each period t but also right after any transaction.
Household
Assets Liabilities
Dt,H = 100 Lt,H = 70
Bt = 20
NWt,H = 50
Firm
Assets Liabilities
Dt,F = 80
NWt,F = 80
Bank
Assets Liabilities
Lt,H = 70 Dt,H = 100
Rt = 110 Dt,F = 80
NWt,B = 0
Household
Assets Liabilities
Dt,H = 180 Lt,H = 70
Bt = 20
NWt,H = 130
Firm
Assets Liabilities
Dt,F = 0
NWt,F = 0
Bank
Assets Liabilities
Lt,H = 70 Dt,H = 180
Rt = 110 Dt,F = 0
NWt,B = 0
Table 3: Numerical example of a wage payment. The firm transfers all of
its revenues to the household sector as wages. This implies a transfer of
deposits from the balance sheet of the former to that of the latter. This
modifies their net worth. Also the bank records this change on the liability
side of its balance sheet, even though its overall net worth remains the same.
Let us now introduce the rules of behaviour for each category of agent
and sector of the economy.
2.1 Production
The representative firm has a limited role to play in our model: it distributes
wages and reacts to disequilibria in the goods market by changing total pro-
duction. The firm is owned by the entire population of households, H, who
all work for it. As shown in Equations 1 and 2, current production (Qt) and
5In principle, such transfer of liabilities takes place among different banks and, as
such, it has to be matched by an equal transfer of reserves on the asset side of their
balance sheets. Nonetheless, this change does not occur in our case because our simplified
framework features a single representative bank.
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prices (Pt) depend on their level in the previous period and on a sensitivity
parameter (φQ and φP respectively) multiplied by the demand gap. This
latter is defined as the previous period difference between aggregate demand
and production, divided by production itself, that is gapt−1 =
ADt−1−Qt−1
Qt−1 .
In other words, the demand gap represents a measure of the real term excess
demand or supply in the past.
Qt = Qt−1 (1 + φQ · gapt−1) (1)
Pt = Pt−1 (1 + φP · gapt−1) (2)
At the beginning of each period, the firm distributes its entire revenues,
collected at the end of t − 1, to the population in the form of wages. The
distribution process is based on constant individual income shares that are
drawn from a Pareto distribution. This is consistent with empirical evidence
suggesting that income is generally distributed according to a power-law
distribution and, more specifically, to a Pareto, particularly at top of the
income scale (Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; Jones, 2015).
2.2 Expenditure Cascades and Financial Assessment
Individual household income (Equation 3) is defined as the sum of wages
(wt,h), profits from the bank (pit,h, if any) and the repayment schedule on
government bonds from the previous period (RSGt−1,h, if any).
yt,h = wt,h + pit,h +RSGt−1,h (3)
After receiving income, households pay taxes based on a progressive tax
system, with constant tax rates set in period 1. Hence, individual disposable
income (ydt,h) is given by income net of the due amount of taxes (Tt,h), as
defined in Equation 4.
ydt,h = yt,h − Tt,h (4)
Consumption behaviour in our model is based on peer effects and imi-
tation. This is consistent with the empirical literature on behavioural eco-
nomics, as reported in Cardaci (2014), Fazzari and Cynamon (2013) and
Frank et al. (2014). In particular, similar to Cardaci (2014), the formula-
tion of desired consumption in our model follows the Expenditure Cascades
(EC) hypothesis introduced by Frank et al. (2014), with a slightly amended
formulation (Equation 5).
Cdt,h = k · ydt,h + a · Ct−1,j (5)
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Therefore, h’s desired consumption is a function of her disposable income
(ydt,h) as well as j’s actual consumption in the previous period, where j is
the household who ranks just above h in the income scale, so that j = h+1.
k is “a parameter unrelated to permanent income level or rank” (Frank
et al., 2014), while the sensitivity parameter a is such that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1:
“when a = 1, h fully mimics j’s consumption; whereas when a = 0, h does
not consider j’s consumption” (Cardaci, 2014).
As already mentioned, households carry out an assessment of their finan-
cial position, by comparing their expected expenditures with their internal
resources. That is, if the sum of desired consumption and the repayment
schedule on loans from the previous period (RSt−1,h6) is higher than the
sum of their disposable income and past deposits (Dt−1,h), households have
a negative financial position and apply for a loan (Ldt,h) to the banking sector.
That is:
if Cdt,h +RSt−1,h > ydt,h +Dt−1,h
then Ldt,h = C
d
t,h +RSt−1,h − ydt,h −Dt−1,h (6)
On the contrary, households with enough internal resources to finance
desired consumption and repayment schedule, ask for government bonds
(Bdt,h). Hence:
if Cdt,h +RSt−1,h ≤ ydt,h +Dt−1,h
then Bdt,h = ydt,h +Dt−1,h − Cdt,h −RSt−1,h (7)
2.3 Bond Market
At the beginning of each period, the government sets its (Gdt ) as a percentage
of GDP. As already pointed out, this decision follows an anti-cyclical rule.
In particular, the government adjusts the initial value of such ratio ( G
d
GDP ,
computed in period 1) based on its sensitivity (φG) to the demand gap in
the previous period.
Gdt
GDPt−1
=
Gd
GDP
− φG · gapt−1 (8)
Afterwards, the government carries out its own financial assessment by
computing the difference between its expected expenditure (the sum of de-
sired public expenditure and the repayment schedule on public bonds issued
in the previous period, RSGt−1) and its available internal resources (the
6The repayment schedule on loans is defined in section 2.4.
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sum of past deposits, Dt−1,g, and the amount of taxes collected, Tt). If this
is negative, the government has enough resources to finance the expected
expenditure. On the contrary, if the difference is positive, the government
has to finance its expenditure by issuing new public bonds. The overall
supply of bonds is defined in Equation 9.
BSt = G
d
t +RSGt −Dt,g (9)
Note that government deposits at time t are defined as the sum between
past deposits and tax revenues, so that Dt,g = Dt−1,g + Tt. We assume
that bonds are one period debt contracts between households and the gov-
ernment. Hence, in the following period, the government will pay back
RSGt−1, which includes both principal and interests. We also make the
assumption that the interest rate on bonds is equal to the policy rate set by
the central bank (see Section 2.4).
It is wort noting that there is no mechanism that guarantees that the
bond market is in equilibrium. In other words, as the formulation of bond
demand and supply are based on independent decisions by households and
the government, rationing may take place in the bond market. Indeed, if
total bond supply is higher than demand, all households asking for bonds get
the desired amount. Still, in the opposite case, all applicants are rationed so
that the amount each h gets is equal to Bdt,h
BSt
BDt
, where BDt is total bond
demand (i.e. BDt =
∑
hB
d
t,h).
2.4 Pay Back Phase and Credit Market
As pointed out in Section 2.2, only households with a negative financial
position enter the credit market. Note, however, that we distinguish two
types of borrowers: consumption borrowers (CB) and borrowers in financial
distress (FDB). CB are all households whose own resources are enough to
pay back their repayment schedule on the loan from the previous period7.
Hence, they enter the market in order to get a loan to finance their desired
consumption only. On the contrary, FDB ask for a new loan not only to
finance consumption but also to perform debt rollover. In other words, FDB
use the new loan to pay back the previous one.
The commercial bank sets a maximum allowable credit supply as a frac-
tion of total credit demand (Equation 10).
LSt = vt
∑
h
Ldt,h (10)
7CB also includes households with zero repayment schedule, that is, those who did not
take any loan in t− 1.
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Note that vt ∈ [vmin, vmax]. That is, the commercial bank endogenously
changes the value of vt within two boundaries (vmin and vmax) that are
exogenously set in the initialisation phase of the model (Conditions 11 and
12). In particular, vt evolves as a function of systemic risk which is proxied
by the household debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous period, debtt−1GDPt−1 . In
fact, we introduce an exogenous parameter (threshold) that represents the
sensitivity threshold to the level of the household debt-to-GDP ratio, so
that if the ratio is higher (lower) than the threshold, the bank decreases
(increases) vt.
if debtt−1GDPt−1 > threshold then vt = vt−1 − φv(vmin − vt−1) (11)
if debtt−1GDPt−1 < threshold then vt = vt−1 + φv(vmax − vt−1) (12)
The sensitivity threshold, as well as the two boundaries for vt, represent
our key parameters in the simulation phase of the model as they act on the
willingness to lend of the commercial bank and on its reaction to systemic
risk. Hence, a more financialised economy is one in which both threshold
and vmax are set to high values.
The commercial bank ranks households in ascending order based on a
measure of their financial soundness - namely the total debt service ratio
(TDS)8 - and supplies credit by matching each individual demand until
LSt = 0. As a consequence, if vt < 1, less financially sound applicants
(namely, households with a higher TDS) will be rationed on the credit mar-
ket thus getting no loans at all. Borrowers who are credit-rationed cannot
pay back their previous loan and, in some cases, finance their desired con-
sumption entirely. Therefore, they will go bankrupt and as such they are
not allowed to apply for another loan for a limited period of time.
Similar to bonds, we assume each loan is a one-period debt contract
corresponding to a repayment schedule defined as RSt,h = Lt,h(1 + r
L
t,h),
to be paid back entirely in the following period. Similar to Russo et al.
(2015) and Cardaci (2014), the interest rate on loans is made up of three
components, as described by Equation 13.
rLt,h = rt + r̂t + rt,h (13)
r̂t is a system-specific component that reflects the sensitivity of the bank
to the household debt-to-GDP ratio of the economy, so that r̂t = ρ
debtt−1
GDPt−1 ,
while rt,h is a household-specific component equal to µTDSt,h, where µ is
the bank sensitivity to household total debt service ratio. Finally, rt is the
policy rate set by the central bank at the beginning of each period (Equation
8Following Cardaci (2014), TDS is defined as the ratio between household repayment
schedule and disposable income.
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14). Similar to desired public expenditure, the central bank reacts to changes
in the demand gap.9
rt = rt−1 + φCB · gapt−1 (14)
Once transactions in the credit market are over, a new PBP begins: all
FDB who successfully got a loan now pay back their due debt RSt−1,h.
2.5 Goods Market
Both the government and households interact with the firm in order to buy
goods. Note that each agent on the demand side may have an actual capac-
ity of spending that differs from the desired one. As a matter of fact, even
though the government is willing to spend an amount equal to Gdt , it is possi-
ble that its liquidity does not allow to do so and its actual spending capacity
is constrained by its current deposits (Dt,g), which include collected taxes,
issued bonds and past deposits. Hence actual maximum government expen-
diture is defined as min(Gdt , Dt,g). Similarly, some households might not be
able to finance their desired consumption entirely due to credit rationing,
as already pointed out. As a consequence, actual maximum expenditure for
each household is equal to min(Cdt,h, Dt,h).
Before transactions take place, the firm compares aggregate demand in
real terms (Equation 15) with the amount of quantities produced.
ADt =
min(Gdt , Dt,g) +
∑
hmin(C
d
t,h, Dt,h)
Pt
(15)
If the former is lower than the latter, each buyer will obtain the de-
manded amount of goods, while the firm will get rid of excess supply at
no cost. In the opposite case, instead, all buyers in the goods market
will be rationed. If such a circumstance occurs, the firm computes a “ra-
tioning ratio” equal to QtADt . This applies equally to the government as
well as each household, so that all buyers are rationed in the same way
and actual household consumption and government spending are defined as
Ct,h = min(C
d
t,h, Dt,h)
Qt
ADt
and Gt = min(G
d
t , Dt,g)
Qt
ADt
.
3 Model Results
Model results are obtained by means of computer simulations. We start by
replicating the following three scenarios:
9As quantities and prices move in the same direction, the central bank is implicitly
targeting inflation as well.
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• a baseline (BS) scenario with income shares that are fixed at the be-
ginning of the first period and remain constant over time;
• a rising-inequality (RS) scenario in which we change the value of indi-
vidual income shares over time to simulate increasing income dispari-
ties;
• finally, a credit-inequality (CS) scenario in which the maximum propen-
sity to lend of the bank rises along with the same rise of inequality
simulated in RS.
We also run some additional experiments to assess different model dy-
namics when financial conditions, as well as policy implementations, change.
For each scenario we perform 20 Monte Carlo (MC) repetitions selecting
a different random seed at each run, similar to Delli Gatti et al. (2011)
and Russo et al. (2015). The choice of our parameter vector, shown in
Table 4, is based on the need to rule out explosive dynamics and unrealistic
patterns. In addition, we also perform both univariate and multivariate
sensitivity analysis in order to test the robustness of model results to changes
in parameter values.
Parameter Value
T Number of periods 1000
H Number of households 200
k Propensity to consume for h = 1 : H − 1 0.8
kH Propensity to consume for h = H 0.6
a Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption 0.6
vmax Maximum propensity to lend 0.4
vmin Minimum propensity to lend 0.1
ρ Bank sensitivity to debt/gdp ratio 0.005
µ Bank sensitivity to TDS 0.005
φQ Output sensitivity to output gap 0.01
φP Price sensitivity to output gap 0.01
φG Government sensitivity to output gap 0.05
φCB Central bank sensitivity to output gap 0.05
φv Speed of adjustment for credit supply 0.05
freeze Number of “freezing” periods for bankrupt borrowers 5
threshold Bank threshold for debt-to-GDP ratio 0.5
Table 4: Model calibration
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Figure 3: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) in BS
(blue), RS (red), CS (yellow).
3.1 Monte Carlo Analysis of the Three Scenarios
For each scenario, we compute the cross-simulation mean of the key vari-
ables. For example, we calculate GDP at each time t as the average of GDP
across the 20 MC ripetitions for each of the three scenarios. Moreover, we
drop the first 200 periods in order to get rid of transients, that is the stabil-
isation phase of the model. Graphs only show the last 800 periods for this
reason. Furthermore, following Cardaci (2014), all data generated by our
model are represented as simple moving averages in order to smooth out the
cyclical fluctuations of the time series.
BS is based on the calibration shown in Table 4, while in the other two
scenarios we implement the following shocks:
• RS: the income share of the top 10% increases gradually (from period
401 to period 600) from 22% to 37%.
• CS: we perform the same inequality shock as in RS, together with a
sudden rise in vmax which increases from 0.4 to 0.8 in period 401.
All the key time series obtained by means of MC repetitions show smooth
and minor oscillations along a stationary trend in the baseline scenario (as
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confirmed by Table 5, which reports also the average growth rates of GDP
in all the 20 MC simulations for the baseline scenario). In particular, the
model seems to stabilise along a quasi-steady state. As shown in Figure 3,
GDP in BS is rather flat over time.
Simulation
Average growth
rate (%)
Mean Variance
Standard
Deviation
1 1.51 15443.80 2848.26 53.37
2 1.31 15685.65 8572.67 92.59
3 1.11 15382.01 3138.18 56.02
4 0.17 15636.93 4992.87 70.66
5 0.61 15593.71 3554.80 59.62
6 1.47 15639.42 8035.21 89.63
7 1.03 15416.06 5673.53 75.32
8 0.89 15428.54 3084.45 55.54
9 0.97 15415.67 2321.31 48.18
10 1.09 15518.28 5624.1 74.99
11 1.07 15606.42 4321.62 65.74
12 0.3 15200.34 2895.02 53.8
13 0.76 15752.72 3546.91 59.55
14 1.39 15536.94 5783.84 76.05
15 0.19 15516.43 2847.19 53.36
16 0.35 15491.02 4382.62 66.2
17 1.1 15574.72 9465.53 97.29
18 0.72 15592.42 3043.92 55.17
19 1.16 15484.07 2836.83 53.36
20 0.36 15471.21 2838.9 53.28
Table 5: Key statistics for BS-GDP in the 20 MC simulations.
Let us provide a narrative for the other two scenarios.
• RS. Figure 3 shows quite distinctly that a rise in income disparities
results in falling GDP. As a matter of fact, when income moves from
the bottom to the top of the distribution, overall desired consumption
rises for a very small number of periods due to stronger expenditure
cascades. However, financial parameters (vmax, threshold and φv) in
RS do not change compared to their baseline values and the econ-
omy remains poorly financialised as it is in BS. As a consequence,
households do not find enough credit supply to finance their increased
desired expenditure and demand for loans. Indeed, in the baseline the
household debt-to-GDP ratio is well below the bank sensitivity thresh-
old and, consequently, vt rises endogenously up to vt = vmax, ∀t. That
is, in BS the banking system endogenously increases its willingness to
lend up to its maximum value as it detects low systemic risk. Yet,
as vmax is calibrated at a low value in BS and RS (see Table 4), the
result of increasing inequality in our economy with a low degree of
financialisation and credit availability is a recession with falling debt
and desired consumption.
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• CS. Similar to RS, as soon as income inequality starts to increase,
household desired consumption grows because of stronger imitation ef-
fects. However, the degree of financialisation is different in CS, as the
commercial bank has a higher maximum willingness to supply credit.
That is, a greater value of vmax allows vt to rise endogenously so that
a broader number of borrowers actually finds the necessary external
resources to finance their desired spending. In fact, even if income
disparities become wider, GDP rises in CS as a result of debt-financed
consumption. Also note that the default rate of borrowers actually
goes down. This is not surprising: higher credit availability results in
a greater number of households who successfully perform debt-rollover
and as such more borrowers are actually able to pay back their older
loans. Nonetheless, this also implies that household debt grows faster
than GDP: the debt-to-GDP ratio increases as well, going beyond the
threshold level set by the commercial bank. This is the turning point:
the bank starts decreasing its willingness to lend and, as a conse-
quence the portion of overall credit demand that is actually matched
by credit supply drops thus triggering the recession. Two aspects are
worth stressing: (1) the fall in GDP is slower than that of desired
consumption and (2) credit demand and supply remain substantially
higher compared to their baseline level, even though they both expe-
rience much wider oscillations along a roughly decreasing trend. The
first point can be explained by the impact of public spending which
decreases but at a fairly slower rate than private spending. The sec-
ond point, instead is explained by looking at the number of households
who need debt rollover, which remains stable at around 60% after the
peak of GDP and debt. This entails a change in the nature of credit:
the higher demand for credit after the recession comes from FDB and
it is, as such, for debt rollover purposes rather than for consumption
financing.
3.2 Financialisation and Institutional Setting
The results of our three main scenarios suggest that where credit constraints
are relaxed, higher loan demand can be matched by a wider availability of
credit thereby resulting in higher household debt that sustains aggregate
demand at the price of greater instability; whereas, if access to credit is
harder and its availability is subject to tighter regulation, widening income
disparities are not compensated by increased borrowing and, as such, the
economy performs badly.
We now want to provide a deeper analysis of the impact of growing
inequality on household debt and the performance of the economy under
different degrees of financialisation. To do so, we run two more sets of
simulations by randomly drawing 20 different values for vmax and threshold.
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Figure 4: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for vmax
equal to 0.5724 (purple), 0.5846 (green), 0.6023 (light blue), 0.6894 (dark
red), compared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
For each of these values, we also perform 20 MC repetitions, each with a
different random seed (for a total of 400 simulations).
In the first case we reproduce a multitude of scenarios where the bank
has a different maximum willingness to lend, while in the second case we
test how greater credit availability interacts with different sensitivities to
the household debt-to-GDP ratio by the bank.
Let us start from changes in vmax. When inequality rises, we increase
the maximum willingness to lend of the bank without changing the value
of threshold or any other parameter in the model. Figure 4 reports our
key results for selected values of vmax. The graphs show that a higher
value of vmax corresponds to a greater boom and bust cycle, as expected.
That is, a stronger degree of financialisation allows for more debt-financed
consumption by households, while a lower amount of credit availability forces
the economy into the recession since the downward pressure on the aggregate
demand is not compensated by higher household debt.
Next we investigate the case of a different threshold in CS. That is,
when inequality increases, the bank is willing to supply more credit, since
vmax jumps from 0.4 to 0.8 in CS, but it also has different sensitivities to
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Figure 5: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for
threshold equal to 0.1048 (green), 0.2041 (purple), 0.2533 (light blue),
0.3705 (dark red) compared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
the household debt-to-GDP ratio (starting from period 1 and letting the
other parameters unchanged). Our results for selected values of threhsold
are shown in Figure 5. Clearly, threshold is a key parameter in determining
model dynamics. As a matter of fact, lower values of threshold imply a worse
performance of the economy, regardless of the increased willingness to lend of
the bank. In particular when threshold is less or equal to 0.1, the economy in
CS performs even worse than in the RS scenario where threshold = 0.5 and
vmax = 0.4. In general, our findings seem to bring about further evidence
that the degree of financialisation matters, even when we look at another
dimension, namely the sensitivity of the commercial bank to systemic risk.
3.3 Policy Responses
We now move on to the analysis of different policy interventions. In par-
ticular, we compare a “Keynesian” type of policy - consisting in a bolder
reaction of desired government expenditure to the demand gap10 - with an
10Notice that in our model “Keynesian” does not indicate a large government, but rather
a proactive one. Our interpretation is consistent with the first part of the General Theory.
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Figure 6: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for dif-
ferent levels of progressive tax system (purple, green and light blue) com-
pared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
increase in ”progressivity” of the tax system that tackles inequality by redis-
tributing income from the top to the bottom of the population. Our results
suggest that the second type of policy has a clearer and stronger effect on
the overall economy with respect to an intervention of the first type.
Simulations are carried out following the same procedure introduced
above: we randomly draw 20 different values for φG and for each of them
we also perform 20 MC repetitions in each of the three scenarios (hence, we
perform 1200 computer simulations in total). We find that, a greater value
of φG does not avoid the recession that results from rising inequality in the
RS scenario. Moreover, in the CS scenario, that is when inequality rises
together with the maximum willingness to lend of the banking system, the
impact of the Keynesian policy reaction is non tangible. That is, the time
series for the key variables do not show any significant difference (in terms
of magnitude, duration and volatility of the boom and bust cycle) compared
to the standard time series obtained in the CS scenario with φG equal to its
baseline value.
What happens if, instead, the government reacts to rising inequality by
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changing the tax rates such that it redistributes income from households at
the top of the distribution to those at the bottom? In this case, the impact
on the economy is strong and positive. Note that we analyse the fiscal
reform in RS so that all model parameters, including the financial ones, do
not change.
Selected simulations are reported in Figure 6. They all show that more
progressive systems manage to counterbalance the (exogenous) change in
the Pareto distribution that alters the original distribution of income. Re-
gardless of the degree of progressivity, the economy has a higher and more
stable GDP compared to the baseline, as well as a similar level of house-
hold debt. This latter is also much lower than in CS. In any case, a more
progressive tax system results in a dramatic boom in GDP followed by a pro-
longed period of stability. This is not surprising: by counterbalancing the
rising trend in inequality, the government provides poorer households with
the necessary internal resources to finance their desired consumption. As a
consequence, the household sector relies much less on debt accumulation so
that both household debt and household debt-to-GDP stabilise around the
baseline level after a certain number of periods.
As far as our result seem to push in favour of a structural reform with
a more progressive tax system, for the sake of completeness it is worth
pointing out that we do not take into account any consideration regarding
the distortionary effect that greater progressivity may have on other aspects
of the economy, such as the functioning of labour markets or firm profits
and investment decisions. The interpretation of our results should therefore
be limited to considering that an increase in progressiveness is more efficient
than macroeconomic policies in tackling the expenditure cascades that follow
an rise in inequality. Any further interpretation would be unwarranted given
the simplified structure of our model.
3.4 Consumption and Income Inequality
One of the major advantages of agent-based models is that they allow to
track and analyse the distribution of key economic variables among the
population of the artificial economy. In particular, we are interested in
assessing how consumption and income inequality change in the three basic
scenarios introduced above. Notice that even though wages and bank profits
are distributed based on exogenous Pareto shares, interests on government
bonds are based on the stock of bonds held by each household. As such,
they might allow income distribution to change endogenously.
In order to measure consumption (income) inequality we compute the
ratio between actual consumption (disposable income) at the richest 20%
and at the poorest 20% of the population. Figure 7 plots the time series of
such ratios in BS, RS and CS.
In the BS scenario, the distribution of both consumption and income
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Figure 7: Consumption (top) and income (bottom) inequality in BS (blue),
RS (red) and CS (yellow).
remains fairly constant. Following the inequality shock in both RS and CS,
the two measures of distribution rise, thus indicating a stronger concentra-
tion of income and consumption at the top. Yet, income inequality is lower
in CS compared to RS. This is explained by looking at the time series of
household consumption for the same percentiles. These are reported in Fig-
ure 8, which shows that households at the top increase their consumption
in CS, thereby accumulating lower savings and, consequently, government
bonds. As such, interest income increases less than in the RS scenario thus
contributing to a lower increase of income inequality in CS compared to RS.
As expected, also consumption inequality is lower in CS with respect to RS.
This is explained by the greater availability of credit to poorer households
in the expansionary phase of the economy.
In general, one can observe that consumption inequality tracks income
inequality in all scenarios, a behaviour that is confirmed by recent empirical
analysis (Aguiar and Bils, 2011).
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check whether our model results are biased by the specific com-
bination of parameter values, we perform both univariate and multivariate
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Figure 8: Household consumption for the poorest 20% (top) and richest 20%
(bottom), in BS (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
sensitivity analysis. This allows us to test the robustness of the model fol-
lowing changes in the parameter vector.
Univariate analysis consists in assessing variations in model outcome
while performing changes in one parameter at a time, leaving all the others
constant. As Delli Gatti et al. (2011) point out, “the model is then believed
to be good if the output values of interest do not vary significantly despite
significant changes in the input values”.
In the univariate case, we select 12 parameters of our model and we
randomly draw 20 values within a reasonable min-max interval for each
individual parameter at a time, leaving all the other ones unchanged. Then,
for each of the 20 values, we perform 20 MC repetitions, each with a different
random seed, in the 3 scenarios (BS, RS and CS). Therefore, the univariate
analysis of a single parameter implies 1200 simulations. Since we explore 12
parameters, we run 14400 simulations in total.
As a general comment, we highlight that for most variables the resulting
variations in output are smaller than the variations in the parameters. This
indicates that results are indeed quite robust with respect to univariate
changes in model parameters.
Table 6 reports the variation for each parameter between its minimum
and maximum value in the sensitivity analysis and the corresponding cross-
series variation in GDP at time 500 for BS and at time 1000 for RS and CS11.
11For the sake of simplicity, we report values for GDP only since our results show that
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With the only exception of a and k, output variations in the baseline scenario
are consistently small for a very wide range of values for each individual
parameter. Notice that variations in two parameters, namely vmax and
φv, do not determine any change in output in BS. Univariate analysis also
shows that individual changes in a wide range of model parameters have no
significant effect on the dynamics of the model in the RS scenario either,
even though freeze has a slightly more relevant role than in BS. Finally, as
expected, all parameters have a more distinctive impact on model dynamics
in CS: our analysis confirms the primary role of the consumption parameters,
a and k, as well as of the financial parameters related to the behaviour of
the banking system, namely threshold and vmax.
Parameter
Variation in
parameter (%)
Variation in
GDP-BS at t 500
(%)
Variation in
GDP-RS at t
1000 (%)
Variation in
GDP-CS at t
1000 (%)
k 65.1 12.68 25.60 102.18
a 302.64 28.4 60.37 231.22
vmax 103.56 0 0 53.69
ρ 355.25 1.3 2.15 14.38
µ 2505.26 0.39 1.59 19.39
φQ 1369.17 0.98 3.47 22.05
φP 1817.82 1.73 3.69 14.36
φG 274.37 2.38 1.59 9.71
φCB 288.55 1.22 1.39 14.08
φv 747.62 0 0 34.72
freeze 350 3.42 10.02 30.9
threshold 660.69 0.45 0.54 59. 44
Table 6: Min-max variations in parameter values for univariate sensitivity
analysis, together with corresponding cross-series variation in GDP at time
500 in BS and at time 1000 in RS and CS.
The univariate analysis for the CS scenario shows that values of a be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 result in shorter boom and longer busts, whereas a > 0.6
implies a wider duration of the expanding phase of the economy. In addition,
values of k lower than 0.5 seem to counterbalance the impact of a higher
willingness to lend, as the CS scenario collapses to the RS in this case. a and
k are not the only relevant parameters in CS. As a matter of fact, our results
suggest that φQ, φP , φv, threshold and freeze have an impact on model
dynamics in this scenario as well. In particular, higher values of φQ and φP
imply greater booms and faster recessions. Higher values of φv and freeze
result in faster and stronger booms and longer busts over time, whereas the
higher threshold, the greater and longer the boom before the bust.
Multivariate analysis tests changes in model results with different cali-
brations of model parameters. In this case, we build 20 parameter vectors
variations in the other key time series are in line with those for GDP.
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Figure 9: GDP in the multivariate sensitivity analysis.
for our model parameters. Each value in the vector is randomly draw within
a reasonable interval. Then, for each of the 20 vectors, we perform 20 MC
repetitions, each with a different random seed, in the three scenarios. Hence,
in the multivariate sensitivity analysis, we run 1200 simulations in total.
The multivariate analysis shows that the behaviour of the model is robust
to parameter changes. Figure 9, which shows GDP for each of the parameter
vectors, proves that almost any combination of parameters leads to the same
dynamics from a purely qualitative point of view. The only exception to
this is represented by the highest blue line in the graph (Figure 9): in CS,
for this specific combination of parameters, GDP booms in the expansion
phase of the economy while falling at a dramatically slow pace during the
recession. By looking at the calibration for this particular case, one may
have an intuition about such dynamics: this scenario features a value of a
and k close to 1, a very low value of freeze (equal to 2), as well as a higher
threshold (around 0.6) and a much greater value for vmax (around 0.8).
We believe that the explanation for the entity of the boom, as well as its
sensationally slow negative growth in the recession, is to be found precisely in
the extremely high values of a, k and vmax that allow the model to follow the
same dynamics as in the standard CS with more pronounced values. In other
words, GDP booms as a consequence of stronger expenditure cascades and
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greater availability of credit. However, after peaking, the economy enters a
recession and GDP starts to fall. Its remarkably small negative growth rate
might be the consequence of very low value of freeze as it implies easier
access to credit markets for both consumption and debt-rollover purposes.
In other words, even though the bank lowers its endogenous willingness to
lend, households who go bankrupt can still access the credit market after
a very few periods and, as such, debt-financed consumption keeps going on
during the recession (even though at a lower speed compared to the boom).
With the exception of the above mentioned case, we can generally con-
clude that results from our simulations are in line with those for the uni-
variate case. That is, our multivariate sensitivity analysis confirms the pri-
mary role of just a few model parameters, namely a and k in determining
model dynamics in BS and RS. It also highlights the importance of vmax
and threshold in the CS case, thus proving the importance of reproduc-
ing alternative financial and policy scenarios by changing the values of such
parameters.
4 Conclusion
Through an agent-based macroeconomic model with a stock-flow consis-
tent structure, we showed how different institutional settings and levels of
financialisation affect the dynamics of an economy hit by an increase of in-
equality. In fact, when income disparities become wider, a dilemma arises.
That is, when the degree of financialisation is poor and financial institutions
are less willing to lend, increasing inequality implies a drop in aggregate de-
mand and output. On the contrary, when credit constraints are relaxed and
the financial sector is prone to lend, a short term positive effect on growth
comes at the price of greater financial instability: a debt-driven boom and
bust cycle emerges. We then carried out an extensive sensitivity analysis,
both univariate and multivariate, that confirms the robustness of our main
findings.
Our results are in line with insights provided by Kumhof et al. (2012)
and Russo et al. (2015). The latter, in particular, build an agent-based
macroeconomic model showing that consumer credit has, on the one hand,
a positive effect on aggregate demand even though, on the other hand, it
accelerates the tendency of the economic system towards a crisis. However,
our work also focuses on policy reactions to rising inequality. As a matter of
fact, our results show that tackling inequality, by means of a more progres-
sive tax system, can compensate for the rise in income disparities thereby
stabilising the economy. Our findings also show that this is a better solution
compared to a proactive (Keynesian) fiscal policy reaction, as the latter has
no tangible counterbalancing effect with respect to increasing income in-
equality. Therefore, in order to avoid being caught in between the Scyilla
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of stagnant growth and the Charybdis of instability, it seems necessary to
act on the structure of the economy and on the problem of inequality at its
roots.
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